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-1JURISDICTION

pursuant

The

Court

to

Section

amended.

has

jurisdiction

78-2-2(3)(j ) f

to entertain this appeal

Utah

Code

Annotated,

as

This matter may be transferred to the Court of Appeals

pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
There are three issues presented for review.
1.

Did the trial court have the power to grant
appropriate relief to a party, if the party had not
demanded such relief in its pleadings?

2.

Is the failure to comply with Rule 69 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure grounds to set aside a
sheriff's sale of real property?

3.

Did any issue of material fact exist that would
preclude the trial court from granting the judgment
setting aside the sheriff's sale of the subject
real property?

(Note:
essentially
Brief.

the

The first
identical

The

second

The

standard

issue

and the
issues
was

third issues presented are
claimed

by

the Appellant's

not covered by the Appellant's

Brief.)

adequately

stated

by

of
the

review

for

Appellant

the
and

first
is

issue

was

restated for the

court's convenience as follows:
If the relief granted was not requested in
the pleadings, is the party in whose favor it
is rendered nevertheless entitled to that
relief.
URCP 54(c)(1).
Did the failure to
request the relief in question prejudice the
opposing party in the preparation or trial of
the case. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244

-2(Utah 1987).
However, the issue omitted in
the pleadings must in fact be raised and the
parties must be provided a full opportunity
to meet it, Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah
1986).
In order to grant relief outside the
pleadings, facts developed by the evidence
must warrant the relief granted and that
relief must be a permissible form of relief
for
the
claims
litigated.
Butler
v.
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Most,
if not all cases granting relief under Rule
54(c)(1), URCP, have done so in the context
of relief being granted after trial where
evidence has been received which bears upon
the issues not framed by the pleadings.
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.,
680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984).
Brief of Appellants at page 1.
The second issue raises the question of whether
an

execution

sale

should

be

set

or not

aside, which question rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court.

The

standard of

review for

this issue is then whether the trial court abused its

discretion.

State vs. District Court, 403 P.2d 634 (Mont. 1965),

Johnson vs.

Jefferson Standard

(Ariz. App.

1967),

and

Life Insurance Co., 429 P.2d 474

generally

30

Am.

Jur.

2d Executions

Section 713.
The

standard

adequately stated

by

of
the

review
Appellant

for

the

and

is

third
restated

court's convenience as follows:
An appeal from a motion for summary judgment
first determines the existence of a genuine
issue of any material fact.
Rule 56(c),
URCP. Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 795
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990). Facts and inferences
drawn therefrom must be viewed in that light
most favorable to the losing party. Provo
City Corp., supra.
In the absence of a
genuine issue of a material fact, it must

issue

is

for the

-3then be determined whether the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Arrow Indus, v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 7 67
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988).
In the absence of a
material fact, the appellate court is free to
reappraise the legal conclusions of the trial
court. Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578
(Utah
App.
1990)? Shire Development v.
Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, (Utah
App. 1990).
Brief of Appellants at page 2.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The interpretation
the Utah Rules of

of portions

Civil Procedure

will be

of Rules

54 and 69 of

determinative of the

outcome of this matter.
The pertinent portion of Rule 54 is as follows:
(c)

Demand for Judgment.

(1)
Generally.
Except as to a party
against whom
a judgment
is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it
is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not
demanded
such
relief
in his
pleadings.
It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it,
determine the ultimate rights of the parties
on each side as between or among themselves.
Rule 54(c)(1).
The pertinent portion of Rule 69 is as follows:
(4)
Purchaser refusing to pay. Every
bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer? and
if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount
bid by him for the property struck off to him
at a sale under execution, the officer may
again sell the property at any time to the
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned

-4thereby, the
party refusing to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is
guilty of a contempt of court and may be
punished accordingly. When a purchaser
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid
of such person.
Rule 69(e) (4).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 6, 1989, the Sheriff of Wayne County attempted
to conduct
Wayne

an execution sale on certain real property located in

County.

The

questions

presented

in

this declaratory

judgment action and now raised on appeal arise from that action.
Thomas

Farr,

the

Farr) was attempting to
Earl

B.

counsel,

bid.

At the

and

execute against

Brinkerhoff

Brinkerhoffs).

Plaintiff

and/or

Minutes

before

homestead declaration and

a

real property

Eunice

sheriff's

Brinkerhoff

sale
the

Appellee (hereafter

only
sale

"correction"

Farr,

owned by
(hereafter

through his

Brinkerhoffs
deed

filed,

had a
both of

which documents appeared to affect the real property being sold.
No
Farr's

bid.

Brinkerhoffs'

money
Some

was

ever

seven

attorney

sought by the Sheriff pursuant to

weeks

after

demanded

a

clarify

the

sum

the
of

purported
money

sale,

from Farr's

attorney.
In

order

declaratory judgment

to

action raising

situation,
three causes

Farr

filed

of action for

determination:
1.

a

When was the claimed homestead allowance money
payable?

-52.

What was the effect of the "correction" deed, what
interest did Farr really purchase at the sale, and
was the earlier dismissal of Farr's action against
Brinkerhoff for fraudulent conveyance obtained by
fraud?

3.

Whether the judgment debtors, the Brinkerhoffs,
could claim any money was due to them or whether
their only remedy was redemption?

Brinkerhoffs then counterclaimed seeking payment of the
homestead allowance and the asserted over bid amount.
Both parties

then filed

The trial court reviewed
August

21,

1989,

the

wherein

Motions for Summary Judgment.

motions
it

and

issued

an

found an issue of fact regarding

Eunice Brinkerhoffs claim of ownership in the real
found only

Order on

property and

an "issue", not an "issue in fact", regarding whether

the sale was consummated.

The court went on to order the parties

to appear and show cause why the Sheriff's sale should not be set
aside

and

why

Eunice

Brinkerhoffs

interest

should

not

be

determined prior to re-execution on Farr's judgment.
On July
Neither side

presented

Brinkerhoff should
Farr also

11, 1990,

evidence.

be an

agreed that

Brinkerhoff maintained

the show cause proceeding was held.
Farr

interest holder

the sheriff's
it should

property

and

set

aside

the

an

sheriffs

that Eunice

in the real property.

sale should

not be

court then granted Eunice Brinkerhoff

conceded

be set aside.

set aside.
interest
sale,

The trial
in

the real

dismissing

the

declaratory judgment action.
The

homestead

allowance

and

interest

Brinkerhoff issues are not raised by this appeal.

of

Eunice

-6STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In

1980

property at issue in

the

this

Brinkerhoffs

cause.

purchased

They

took

the

title

real

as joint

tenants by warranty deed (R.63).
2.

A judgment against Mr. Brinkerhoff was rendered in

Alaska on September 20, 1985

for

$65,520.20

in

favor

of Farr

(R.13, 14, 66, 155).
3.

Shortly

thereafter the Brinkerhoffs created EBB,

Inc., a Utah corporation, and conveyed the subject

real property

to that corporation by deed dated December 23, 1985, (R.65, 155).
The consideration flowing to
the land

Brinkerhoffs for

the conveyance of

to EBB, Inc., was the ownership of the new corporation,

although actual stock certificates

were

not

issued

(R.60, 65,

66) .
4.

After

domesticating

filed suit against the Brinkerhoffs
avoid as

a fraudulent

his
and

judgment in Utah, Farr
EBB,

Inc.,

seeking to

conveyance the December 23, 1985, deed to

the corporation (R.10, 11, 12, 155, 156).
5.

Subsequently, Mr.

Brinkerhoff personally

met with

Paul D. Lyman, counsel for Farr, on November 23, 1988, to discuss
that fraudulent conveyance action (R.156).

This meeting resulted

in an agreement for the suit to be dismissed in return for a deed
conveying the real property
individually

(R.156).

Mr

from EBB,
Lyman

Inc., to

drafted

the

Mr. Brinkerhoff
deed,

and Mr.

Brinkerhoff signed it as corporate agent for EBB, Inc. (R.17, 66,
156) .

-76.

Farr's counsel advised Mr. Brinkerhoff during this

meeting that the deed would completely divest Mrs. Brinkerhoff of
her

interest

in

the

property

(R.156).

Mr. Brinkerhoff later

denied that he intended to divest his wife or the
their interests

in the

property, and

that he

power to do so, and suggested that Farr's

corporation of
had the right or

counsel took advantage

of him (R.66f 67).
7.

Neither Farr,

his counsel nor Mr. Brinkerhoff had

contact regarding these matters
time, and

she later

with

stated that

Mrs.

Brinkerhoff

at that

she "did not agree to, approve

of, or acquiesce in" a deed which divested the corporation of its
title to

the land,

and never

"waived any claim she had in" the

land or the corporation (R.60).
8.
had

a

fair

Mr. Brinkerhoff
market

$257,413.00 (R.65).
for $350,500.00

value
In

claims the

in

1980,

1986, after

(R.65).

subject real porperty

before

improvements,

of

improvements, it appraised

At the time of the Sheriff's sale, the

property was encumbered by a mortgage

to First

Security Bank in

the amount of $110,000.00 (R.67).
9.

Farr executed against the property and a sheriff's

sale occurred on March
personally attend
who bid on his
His

bid

(R.67).

amount

6,

the sale,

behalf (R.3,
was

1989,

(R.67,

157).

Farr

did not

but was

represented by his counsel

T.12).

Farr was

$121,416.05,

but

he

the only bidder.

did not pay the bid

-810.
recorded

a

Immediately prior
homestead

claim

deed to the property which
jointly (R.67).
both the
discussed

Before

homestead
those

to

the

sale,

Mr. Brinkerhoff

for $10f000.00f and a "correction"

vested

title

in

him

and

his wife

making the bid, Farr's counsel reviewed

declaration
instruments

and
by

the

correction

telephone

with

deed, and

counsel

for

Brinkerhoffs (T.12).
11.

Mr. Brinkerhoff claims that Farr's Alaska judgment

totalled $89,306.72 on the date of sale (R.68).
12.

Following

Certificate of Sale and

the

sale,

secured

the

Farr's counsel prepared a
signature

thereto

of the

Deputy Wayne County Sheriff who conducted the sale (R.3, 26, 27),
the latter

having

signed

the

Certificate

on

March

17, 1989

(R.27), eleven days after the sale.
13.

By

letter

dated

April

25,

1989, counsel for

Brinkerhoffs requested that Farr pay his bid (R.3, 28, 29).
responded

by

filing

Farr

the underlying declaratory judgment action

against Brinkerhoffs dated May 4, 1989, seeking certain relief as
to (a) the time when payment of the homestead allowance should be
made, (b) the
subject real

interest,

property, and

to Brinkerhoffs for
Brinkerhoffs
thereunder

if

an

answered
was

any,

improper,

Mrs.

Brinkerhoff

in the

(c) whether redemption was available

amount
the

of

less

Complaint,
and

than

Farr's

contending

counterclaimed

bid (R.l-6).
that
for

relief
(a)

adjudication that Mrs. Brinkerhoff owned one-half of the land,

an

-9and (b), in essence, for the court to confirm the sheriff's sale
and grant a judgment against Farr (R.32-37).
14.
(R.40,

In June, 1989f

41), without

Farr

affidavits

memorandum was filed claiming
(R.42-54).

moved
to

for

summary judgment

support

the same

the motion, but a

relief as

his Complaint

Brinkerhoffs then moved for summary judgment (R.134-

142), supporting their motion with affidavits and other documents
(R.57-133).
15.

On August

Order, wherein the
denied

because

21, 1989, the District Court issued an

pending
"an

issue

Brinkerhoffs ownership
existed regarding

of

existed

judgment were
regarding

Mrs.

because "an issue"

sale was consummated, when it was

when

went on

summary

property and

whether the

The court

for

fact"

in the

uncertain what was sold and
(R.145).

motions

the

bid

price

was

not paid

to order the parties to appear and

show cause why the sheriff's sale should not be set aside and why
Mrs.

Brinkerhoff's

interest

should

not be determined prior to

further execution on the judgment (R.145).
16.
filed

an

In response to the

Affidavit,

entitled

court's Order,
"Proferred

Lyman," which fully explained the
November 23,

1988, meeting

events

of the

which explanation contraverted what
asserted

regarding

property (R.155-157).

his

wife's

Farr's counsel

Testimony of Paul D.
that

occurred

in the

affiant and Mr. Brinkerhoff,
Mr. Brinkerhoff

interest

in

the

had earlier
subject real

-1017.
hearing

On July

occurred

11, 1990,

and

neither

the court directed show cause

side

presented

any

additional

evidence, but both counsel argued at length (R.151, 152).
18.

At

the

hearing

Farr's counsel conceded on the

issue of Mrs. Brinkerhoff's interest in the real property (R.151,
152 and

T.4).

Neither party

has appealed that issue and it is

resolved (R. 151, 152).
19.

At the hearing the

court refused

to consider any

homestead issue and neither party has appealed that issue (T.27).
20.
Brinkerhoffs,
sheriff's

sale

During the
though
was

course of the July 11, 1990, hearing,

their

attorney,

defective.

acknowledged

that

the

This happened in a discussion

between the court and counsel that went as follows:
THE COURT:

At the time it was sold, they were supposed
to get the money right then, weren't they?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT:

And they didn't get it?

MR. TAYLOR:

They never got anything.
paid.

THE COURT:

All right. So the sale was defective in
that regard.

No money was

MR. TAYLOR: In that regard,
(T.8, 9)
21.

However,

Brinkerhoffs,

later argued that the admittedly defective
not be set aside (T.19).

through their attorney,
sheriff's sale should

-1122.

The court ultimately set aside the sheriff's sale

and dismissed the declaratory judgment action (R.152, T. 25, 26).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT APPROPRIATE
RELIEF TO A PARTY, IF THE PARTY HAD NOT DEMANDED
SUCH RELIEF IN ITS PLEADINGS?
Rule 54(c)(1) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil Procedure

allows a court to grant relief to which a party is entitled, even
though it is not

demanded in

its pleadings.

Through

case law

interpretation of this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has said that
the non-pleaded relief is only
either

raised

or

tried

at

authorized ' on
the

Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.,

issues

trial court level.
680 P.2d

733 (Utah

that were
Combe vs.
1984) and

cases cited therein.
The issue

of whether the subject sheriff's sale should

be set aside was directly raised by the
summary judgment,

which sought for confirmation of the sale.

was directly raised by the

court's

wherein the

the parties

court ordered

Order

why the sale should not be set aside.
to Farr

Brinkerhoffs' motion for

of

August

It

21, 1989,

to appear and show cause
Thus,

the relief granted

in setting aside the sheriff's sale, although not raised

by the initial pleadings,

was clearly

raised and

the court's power to grant the relief it did.

it was within

-12POINT II
IS THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 69 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE A SHERIFF'S
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY?
Local district

courts control the processes that arise

after judgments are effected.

Failure to comply with Rule

69 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has been grounds to set aside a
sheriff's sale of real

property.

Taubert v.

Roberts, 747 P.2d

1046 (Utah 1987).
The trial

court correctly reviewed whether the subject

sheriff's sale complied with
parties

to

respond,

Rule

concluded

69

and,

that

defective and should be set aside.

the

after

allowing all

sheriff's

This was a

sale

was

discretionary act

and, absent an abuse of this discretion, should not be reversed.

POINT III
DID ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT WOULD PRECLUDE
THE TRIAL COURT FROM GRANTING THE JUDGMENT SETTING
ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY?
For the trial court to make its ruling, there had to be
no remaining material issues of fact.
turned on

two material issues of fact.

Mrs. Brinkerhoff have in the subject
was

The

resolved

by

Farr

conceding

Second, was the bid price paid?

court's determination

First, what interest did

real property?
Mrs.

This issue

Brinkerhoff's interest.

The fact the bid was not paid

-13was acknowledged

by Brinkerhoffs' attorney at the July 11, 1990,

hearing.
There may be other factual

issues,

but

they

are not

material to the court's decision to set aside the sheriff's sale.
Consequently, they can be ignored.
aside

the

sale

for

failure

to

The

court's

comply

with

order setting
Rule 69 was not

precluded by any material issues of fact.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT APPROPRIATE
RELIEF TO A PARTY, IF THE PARTY HAD NOT DEMANDED
SUCH RELIEF IN ITS PLEADINGS?
Rule 54(c)(1) of
controls this issue.
(c)

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil Procedure

It reads as follows:

Demand for judgment.
(1)
Generally.
Except as to a party
against whom
a judgment
is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not
demanded
such
relief
in his
pleadings.
It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it,
determine the ultimate rights of the parties
on each side as between or among themselves.
A leading case that interprets and applies this rule is

Combe vs. Warren's Family
1984).

Drive-Inns, Inc.,

680 P.2d

733 (Utah

In Combe the Supreme Court presented the general rule

-14that

arises

from

Rule

54(c) (1),

when

the

court

began

its

analysis, as follows:
It is a rule of long standing that every
final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings.
Rule
54(c)(1), Utah R.Civ.P.; Behrens v. Raleigh
Hills Hospital, Inc., Utah, 675 P.2d 1179
(1983), and cases there cited.
However,
findings which are at variance with the
claims of both parties are not favored and
are carefully scrutinized on review. West v.
West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965).
Although Rule 54(c)(1) permits relief on
grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so
far as to authorize the granting of relief on
issues neither raised nor tried. Cornia v.
Cornia, Utah, 546 P.2d 890 (1976).
Combe, at 735.

(Emphasis added.)

The Wayne County trial
enter

a

final

judgment

court in

the case

granting relief that neither party had

specifically demanded in its initial pleadings.
54(c)(1) and

at hand did

Pursuant to Rule

the interpretation of Rule 54(c)(1) as presented in

Combe, the propriety of such an action turns upon the question of
whether the

relief granted related to issues "raised" or "tried"

by the pleadings.
question

is

Combe, at 735.

whether

the

relief

There was no trial so the only
granted was based upon issues

"raised" in the proceedings.
Just as every coin has only two sides,
and a

reverse side,

confirmed sale or a

every sheriff's
set aside

sale.

an obverse side

sale has only two sides, a
If either

party seeks to

have the subject sheriff's sale confirmed, then the issue of

-15whether

the

sale

ought

to

be

set

aside

is correspondingly

raised.
Farr's

declaratory

action

Complaint

sought

an

interpretation of how the actions prior to, at, and after the
purported sheriff's
issue of

sale should

whether the

be construed,

sale should

be set

which raised the

aside.

Brinkerhoffs

counterclaim raised the same sale set aside questions.
Brinkerhoffs'

attorney

acknowledged

in

the Brief of

Appellants, the following:
Brinkerhoffs also moved for summary judgment,
asking that the Sheriff's sale be confirmed,
in essence, and that Farr be compelled to pay
his bid, or in the alternative, for judgment
against Farr.
Brief of Appellants at page 11.
Thus, Brinkerhoffs'
issues

of

"sale

(Emphasis added.)

own

confirmation"

Brief
and,

acknowledges

that the

by logical inference, its

opposite, "sale set aside", were raised by the pleadings.
Furthermore, the trial court by its Order of August 21,
1989,

ruling

on

the

parties'

motions

for

summary judgment,

specifically stated as follows:
There is
an
consummated.

issue

if

the

sale

was

(R.145)
The court then went on to state as follows:
Both parties are ordered to appear and show
cause why the court should not set aside the
Sheriff's sale. . .
(R.145)

-16The court

then left it up to the parties to arrange a hearing on

these issues.
On

July

11,

1990,

anticipated hearing was held.
evidence on

almost

one

year

later,

the

Had Brinkerhoff chosen to present

the set aside issue, which was clearly raised by the

court in its Order

of August

21, 1989,

he could

have done so.

Instead, neither party presented evidence, both sides choosing to
simply present additional argument
raised.

The

trial

court

on the

issues that

had been

then granted the relief it felt was

appropriate, which conformed to the issues that had been raised.
Brinkerhoff is hard pressed
the

trial

court

stepped

outside

granted relief on issues that were
as interpreted
cited cases
court

by the

be

of

its

somehow claim that
bounds of power and

not "raised".

Rule 54(c)(1)

Utah Supreme Court in Combe and the other

was properly

should

to now

followed and

affirmed.

the action

of the trial

The issue of the sheriff's sale's

validity was squarely raised and properly before the

court.

The

relief granted to Farr, which had not been specifically raised by
the initial pleadings, was

appropriate

and

within

the court's

power to grant.

POINT II
IS THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 69 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GROUNDS TO SET ASIDE A SHERIFF'S
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY?

-17A.

Who Controls Enforcements of Post-Judgment Processes?
Before the issue raised in this section is addressed, a

foundation issue needs to

be addressed.

That

foundation issue

is, "Who controls the enforcement of post-judgment processes?"
It

is

axiomatic

that

the

local district court must

have the power to control the processes that arise after
judgments are effected.

The general rule is as follows:

There are numerous references in cases to the
right of a court to grant relief from an
execution by vacation thereof. This is true,
not only of a writ of execution, . . ., but
also of particular steps taken thereunder,
such as the levy, sale, and deed. Such power
of the court, arising from its complete
control of its own process, is inherent. . .
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions Section 711.
Rule

69

acknowledges the
processes arising

of

the

control of
from their

Utah

Rules

the local
rulings as

of

Civil

district courts over the
the following excerpts

from Rule 69 demonstrate:
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a
writ of execution unless the court otherwise
directs, . . .
Rule 69(a) (Emphasis added.)
The writ of execution must be issued in the
name of the State of Utah, sealed with the
seal of the court and subscribed by the
clerk. . . .
Rule 69(b) (Emphasis added.)

Procedure,

•18B.

Is The Failure To Comply With Rule 69 Grounds To Set Aside A
Sheriff's Sale Of Real Property?
Rule 69(e)(4) of

controls this issue.

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil Procedure

It reads as follows:

(4)
Purchaser refusing
to pay.
Every
bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and
if the purchaser
refuses to pay the amount
bid by him for the property struck off to him
at a sale under execution, the officer may
again sell the property
at any time to the
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned
thereby, the party
refusing
to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is
guilty of a contempt
of court and may be
punished
accordingly.
When
a purchaser
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid
of such person.
There

appears

interprets Subsection
(e)(1)

has

been

to

be

(e)(4) of

the

no
Rule

subject

of

Utah case law that directly
69.
the

However, Subsection
Utah

Supreme

interpretation in the case of Taubert vs. Roberts,

Court's

747 P.2d

1046

(Utah 1987).
In Taubert, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a ruling by
the trial court, which lower court ruling had upheld the validity
of a

sheriff's sale

of real

property.

The Supreme Court held

that the steps specified by Rule 69(e)(1) were

necessary to levy

on real property and that the required steps had not begun within
the time allowed by the rule.
set aside.

Consequently, the Taubert sale was

Taubert, at 1050.
Applying the

Subsection

(e)(1)

(e)(4), if the trial court concluded

standard to Subsection

that the

sheriff's sale of

the Brinkerhoff property was not consummated or was faulty in

-19that

it

failed

to

comply

with

the

necessary

steps

under

Subsection (e)(4), then the trial court can set aside the sale.
The trial court does

this as

a part

of its

power to

control the processes that arise relating to real property within
its district.
a foreign

(Note:

The process in the case at hand arose from

judgment, which no one disputes was properly filed and

docketed in Wayne County.

It

is

entitled

to

full

faith and

credit in Utah.)
Brinkerhoff

argues

Savings v. Mehr, 791 P.2d
situation presented

that

217

in this

Occidental/Nebraska

(Utah

App.

appeal.

(Note:

the case that Brinkerhoff presented to
at

the

July

11,

1990,

1990),

hearing.)

Federal

controls the

Occidental is also

the court

for its review

The Occidental case can be

distinguished from the present case because Occidental involved a
"trustee

sale"

and

the

present

case

involved

a

"judicial

Although there are some similarities between

a trustee

execution sale".

sale

and

a

judicial

execution sale, the creditor can directly

control a trustee sale, whereas
sheriff, controls

court,

through

judicial execution sales.

turned on asserted deficiencies
the creditor,

the

whereas in

that were

the present

the county

The Occidental case
under the

control of

the debtor or the sheriff

controlled the asserted deficiencies.
In the present case the trial court correctly
the

sheriff's

sale

complied with or not.

had

been

consummated,

i.e.,

asked if

was Rule 69

When it was unclear what had been sold

-20(due

to

Brinkerhoff's

declaration and a
clear

that

last

minute

questionable

the

bid

price

filing

"correction"

had

of

a

deed)

homestead
and

not been paid, the trial court

issued an Order requiring the parties to show cause why
should

not

be

set

aside.

it was

the sale

The trial court then allowed both

parties to make additional presentations and arguments on the set
aside issue.

Finally, with its discretionary power, the trial

court concluded

Rule 69 had not been complied with and set aside

the sheriff's sale of the subject real property.
The standard
whether

the

trial

for

review

court

abused

of

a

its

discretionary

discretion in so ruling.

State vs. District Court, 403 P.2d 634 (Mont.
Jefferson Standard

Life Insurance

1967) and 30 Am. Jur.

20

court,

the

in

light

of

Co., 429

Executions

act is

1965), Johnson vs.
P.2d 474 (Ariz App.

Section

713.

The trial

Taubert decision regarding Subsection

(e)(1) of Rule 69, acted cautiously and fairly and concluded that
the sheriff's
to follow

sale should

Rule 69,

exercise its

be set

aside.

constituted grounds

discretion and

The sheriff's failure
for the

trial court to

set aside the sheriff's sale.

was appropriate and not an abuse of discretion.

This

It should not be

reversed.

POINT III
DID ANY ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST THAT WOULD PRECLUDE
THE TRIAL COURT FROM GRANTING THE JUDGMENT SETTING
ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY?

-21Rule 56(c)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states

in pertinent part the following:
. . .The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact . . . .
Almost an innumerable number of cases have confirmed this general
rule.

For the purpose of

needs to

be more

this appeal,

closely examined

the specific

is, "does

exist about which there is a genuine issue?"
v. Stillman,

619 P.2d

1390 (Utah 1980).

issue that

any material fact
Heglar

Ranch Inc.

The Utah Supreme Court

has stated:
"The foregoing rule does not preclude summary
judgment simply whenever some fact remains in
dispute, but only when a material fact is
genuinely controverted."
Heglar, at 1391.
The trial court made it very clear that its decision to
set aside the sheriff's sale was because it
sale had

been consummated.

(See

court questioned "what was sold?"
could happen

making its

felt were material.

disputed facts,

but the

believe the

Order, August 21, 1989).
It also

questioned if

"when (the) bid price was not paid?"

the trial court in
that it

did not

ruling raised

The

a sale

Consequently,

two factual issues

There may well be a number of other

key question

is, "was

there a genuine

controversy regarding the material facts?"
The first material fact question was, "what interest in
the real property did Mrs. Brinkerhoff have?"

It remained a

-22genuine issue

until the July 11, 1990, hearing.

At that hearing

Farr conceded that she had an interest in the real property.
Thereafter,

there

was

no

longer

a

material

issue

of

fact

regarding that issue.
The second material fact question was, "whether the bid
price had been paid?"
shown

by

This

Brinkerhoffs'

fact was

also not

attorney's

at issue

as is

discussion with the court

during the July 11, 1990, hearing:
THE COURT:

At the time it was sold, they were supposed
to get the money right then, weren't they?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
THE COURT:

And they didn't get it?

MR. TAYLOR:

They never
paid.

THE COURT:

All right. So the sale was defective in
that regard.

got anything.

MR. TAYLOR: In that regard.
Hearing on
8 and 9.

No money was

. ..

Order to Show Cause, Transcript of Proceedings, pages
In the Brief of Appellants, under Point II, a series of

asserted disputes surrounding non-material facts is raised, e.g.,
whether

Farr's

counsel

interview between

was

confused,

what

happened

fact.

an

Mr. Brinkerhoff and Farr's counsel many months

prior to the sheriff's sale and whether the bid was
None of

at

these asserted

issues rises

reasonable.

to the level of a material

If they are not material to the court's decision, then the

court was

not precluded from granting the judgment setting aside

the sheriff's sale.

-23CONCLUSION
The
power to

District

grant

entitled.

Farr

The issue

been raised.

Court
the

setting

relief

of the

to

in

Wayne County had the

which

he

was ultimately

validity of the sheriff's sale had

Pursuant to the court's powers under the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, and in light of the Utah Supreme Court's past
handling of sheriff's sales, the court
and set

could use

aside the subject sheriff's sale.

issues of material fact

and,

its discretion

There were no genuine

consequently,

the

court

was not

precluded from issuing the judgment that it issued.
The District Court's action should be affirmed.
DATED this _ ,

day of March, 1991.

r
KW
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- ^Tv^

PAUL D. LYMAN
vi
Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby

certify that a full, true and correct copy of

the above and foregoing
United States
thereon

fully

BRIEF

OF

APPELLEE

was

placed

mail at

in the

Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage
<n h _
prepaid on the
*
day of March, 1991,

addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Taylor
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 847-01
1_^—:—5^ac
^J

-24ADDENDUM
TRIAL COURT ORDER, DATED AUGUST 21, 1989
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, DATED AUGUST 15, 1990

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS FARR,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

ORDER

EARL BRINKERHOFF
and EUNICE BRINKERHOFF,

CIVIL NO. 1218

Defendant.

The Motions for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff and
Defendants are both denied for the following reasons:
1.

There is an issue of fact if Eunice Brinkerhoff
has any ownership in that property allegedly sold.

2.

There is an issue if the sale was consumated. If
so, what was sold, and if the court should allow
same when bid price was not paid.

Both parties are ordered to appear and show cause why
the Court should not set aside the Sheriff's sale and why the interest
of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property should not be determined prior
to execution on the foreign judgment.
The date of hearing shall be set at the convenience of
Court and Counsel.
Dated this

^/

day of August, 19*89%^

\

9

~wr^

DON V. TIBBSy

TIBBS/
DISTRICT JUDGE

Lh$

Civil // 1218
Wayne County
Order
August, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On the

day of August, 1989, I mailed a copy of

the above and foregoing Order to the following, postage pre-paid
from offices at Manti, Utah:
Marcus Taylor, Attorney for Defendants
108 North Main, Richfield, Utah, 84701
Paul D. Lyman, Attorney for Plaintiff
Sevier County Courthouse, Richfield, Utah, 84701
Carole B. Mellor
District Court Administrator

Paul D. Lyman #4522
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: 896-6812
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS FARR,
Plaintiff,

vs.
EARL B. BRINKERHOFF and
EUNICE BRINKERHOFF,
Defendants.

.

i

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Civil No. 1218

This matter came before the Court on July 11, 1990f at the District
Courtroom, Loaf Utah, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. The Plaintiff was
present through counsel, Paul D. Lyman, and the Defendants were present
through counsel, Marcus Taylor.

After both parties having previously

submitted Motions for Summary Judgment, the parties were ordered to appear
before the Court and show cause why the Court should not set aside the
Sheriff's sale and why the interest of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property
should not be determined prior to execution on the foreign judgment.

Both

counsel were allowed to argue at length and stated that their respective
positions were before the Court through oral argument, previous written
argument and affidavits on file. The counsel for the Plaintiff offered to
concede that Eunice Brinkerhoff was a joint tenant in the property, if the
Sheriff's sale was set aside.
The Court, based upon the undisputed portions of the parties'
affidavits in their respective motions for summary judgment, pointed out that
on March 6, 1989, an execution sale of the Defendants' real property in Wayne

/

Page 2—Order of Dismissal
Thomas Farr vs. Earl B. Brinkerhoff, et al

County was scheduled and conducted; that immediately prior to said sale, the
Defendant, Earl B. Brinkerhoff, caused a "Warranty Deed (Correction)" along
with a "Declaration of Homestead" to be filed with the Wayne County Recorder;
that said correction deed purported to change the record ownership of said
real property from just Earl B. Brinkerhoff to Earl B. Brinkerhoff and Eunice
Brinkerhoff, as joint tenants; and that an amount was bid at the sale, which
the Defendants claim was more than the debt, but no money was collected.
The March 6, 1989, sale was not consummated because it is not clear
what was being purchased and the bid price was not paid, and in light of this
Court's ruling and the Plaintiff's offer to concede on the issue of Eunice
Brinkerhoff being a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff, there are no more
issues to be tried.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The Court then issued the following Order or Dismissal,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

The March 6, 1989, Sheriff's sale is set aside.

2.

Eunice Brinkerhoff is a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff in

the following described real property in Wayne County, Utah:
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southwest
quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 36, Township
28 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian and running
thence South 200 feet; thence West 200 feet; thence North
200 feet; thence East 200 feet to point of beginning.
3.

This declaratory relief action is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MtfW %i^c

MARCUS TAYLOR
Attorney for Defer

day of August, 1990.
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)

DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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